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Auctions have been around for more than 2,000 years. 
The Babylonians arranged marriages by auction. The Ro-
man legions sold booty at auction, and on one notable oc-
casion, the Praetorian Guard killed the emperor and put up 
the whole empire for auction. Today, members of the gen-
eral public sell at auction such diverse things as tobacco, 
fish, cut flowers, works of art, thoroughbred horses, and 
used cars. The U.S. government sells natural resources by 
auction and may soon take bids on radio airwaves and 
pollution rights. And in the largest auctions in recorded 
human history, the U.S. Treasury each year sells roughly 
$2.5 trillion worth of debt. With such large amounts at 
stake, even small improvements in the Treasury's auction 
procedure can lead to large gains for taxpayers. In this pa-
per, we review what economic theory tells us about ways 
to improve this procedure. 
The Treasury's current procedure is what is known as 
a multiple-price, sealed-bid auction. Roughly a week be-
fore each of its more than 150 annual auctions, the Trea-
sury announces the amount of debt it plans to sell. Eligi-
ble dealers and brokers submit competitive sealed bids 
which specify the price they are willing to pay for a par-
ticular quantity of debt. Investors may also submit so-
called noncompetitive bids up to a fairly low quantity ceil-
ing without specifying a price if they are willing to accept 
whatever will turn out to be the average accepted-bid 
price. Once all bids are in, the Treasury first adds up the 
quantity of noncompetitive bids and subtracts that from 
the total debt it plans to sell. Then, starting at the highest 
price bid and moving down, the Treasury adds up the 
competitive quantities bid until it hits its total. Each com-
petitive bidder who has won (or, in the Treasury's jargon, 
has been "awarded" the bid) pays the price stated in his or 
her sealed bid; thus, each winning bidder may pay a dif-
ferent price. Noncompetitive bidders, again, pay the aver-
age of the awarded competitive bids. 
This multiple-price, sealed-bid procedure, of course, is 
not the only way to design an auction. Indeed, most econ-
omists agree that it is not the best one for the Treasury. 
We argue here, based on economic theory, that the Trea-
sury should switch to a uniform-price, sealed-bid auction. 
Under this procedure, with bids ordered by price, from the 
highest to the lowest, the Treasury would still accept quan-
tities up to the amount it planned to sell, but the price 
winning bidders paid wouldn't vary. Instead, all bidders 
would pay the same price, that of the highest bid not ac-
cepted—the price that just clears the market. 
The main reason to make this change is that the current 
auction procedure provides incentives for bidders to ac-
quire more information than is socially desirable. In the 
current procedure, again, bidders pay the amount of then-
bids if they win. Therefore, bidders have an incentive to 
shade their bids below the maximum amount they are 
willing to pay in order to try to obtain the securities at a 
lower price. But bid-shading carries with it the risk that 
the bid is so low that the bidder is not awarded any secu-
3 rities. In selecting a bid price, therefore, bidders want to 
balance the gain from a lower winning bid against the risk 
of not winning. Thus, they have incentives to learn what 
others plan to bid. 
In a uniform-price auction, by contrast, the price paid 
by a winning bidder does not depend on that bidder's bid. 
Therefore, bid-shading is less extreme than in multiple-
price auctions, and the incentives to acquire information 
about what others plan to bid is smaller. Information about 
how bidders plan to bid is of no value to society as a 
whole since such information merely ends up redistribut-
ing payments from uninformed to informed bidders. But 
acquiring this information is costly. The loser from the re-
sources expended in information acquisition is the Trea-
sury (and, of course, ultimately, the taxpayers). A uniform-
price, sealed-bid auction will therefore yield more revenue 
to the Treasury. 
Uniform-price auctions are also likely to be less sus-
ceptible to market manipulation. In 1990, Salomon Broth-
ers Inc. violated Treasury rules designed to protect against 
market manipulation, and in 1991 the market was alleged-
ly manipulated twice more. We argue that episodes of this 
kind are less likely under a uniform-price auction. 
The Treasury did, in fact, experiment with such an auc-
tion briefly in the 1970s, but abandoned the experiment as 
largely inconclusive. As will become obvious, we think 
the experiment was abandoned too hastily. In any event, 
more recently, the Treasury embarked on a review of its 
auction procedures in collaboration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. (See U.S. Department of the 
Treasury et al. 1992.) Therefore, a review of what eco-
nomic theory tells us about Treasury auctions seems par-
ticularly desirable. (For recent reviews of auctions in gen-
eral, see McAfee and McMillan 1987, Mester 1988, and 
Milgrom 1989.) 
The plan for our review is as follows. We begin by 
laying out a general framework for analyzing bidder be-
havior in auctions. We apply this framework to two mod-
els in which only one unit of an object is being sold at 
auction: a simple model called the independent private-
values model and an extension called the correlated-val-
ues model. We then discuss more complicated auctions 
like the Treasury's, auctions in which more than one unit 
is sold. We argue that the incentives to acquire informa-
tion are smaller with uniform-price auctions than with 
multiple-price auctions and that uniform-price auctions are 
less susceptible to manipulation. 
The General Framework: Game Theory 
Let's start by describing how economists generally think 
about bidder behavior under any type of auction proce-
dure. The framework we use is game theory. This is a 
way to analyze how rational decisions are made by com-
petitors in uncertain conditions. In auctions, of course, the 
competitors are primarily the bidders. 
A seller faced with the problem of choosing among 
auction procedures must predict how bidders will act. 
Each bidder in a given auction, in turn, must predict how 
other bidders will act. These actions depend both on how 
much the bidder values the object being sold and on 
guesses about how others will bid on it. Each bidder's val-
uation of the object depends on his or her information 
about the object. For example, a bidder on an oil tract 
may know something about oil or neighboring tracts. Ch-
in an art auction, bidders may know how valuable a paint-
ing will be to them. Successful bidding at an auction, 
therefore, involves successful guesses about other bidders' 
information and successful guesses about how these others 
will guess about each other's information. 
This is an apparently intractable problem, but the lan-
guage of noncooperative game theory offers a neat way 
around it. The way is to shift attention from bids to bid-
ding strategies. Formally, a (pure) strategy for a bidder is 
a description of the relationship between what is known— 
the information of the bidder and the history of the auc-
tion—and what should occur—for each bidder's informa-
tion and each stage of the auction, the appropriate decision 
for the bidder to make. Of course, in practice, bidders sim-
ply choose their bids rather than their strategies. A strat-
egy for a particular bidder is simply a way of describing 
how other bidders imagine the particular bidder will act 
under various circumstances. A Nash equilibrium is a col-
lection of strategies, one for each bidder, such that given 
the strategies of the other bidders, no one prefers to change 
his or her own strategy. 
Single-Object Auctions 
From this perspective, the nature of the information pos-
sessed by each bidder is critical in determining the out-
come of a given auction procedure. The seller's problem 
is simply to compare equilibrium outcomes across auction 
procedures and pick the one that does best for him or her. 
(Of course, the chosen auction procedure may alter bid-
ders' incentives to acquire information. We return to this 
theme later.) Here we consider two models of the infor-
mation possessed by bidders: the independent private-val-
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ues model and the correlated-values model. In both, we 
assume only one object is being sold. 
The Independent Private-Values Model 
Suppose a painting is being auctioned. Each buyer knows 
how valuable this painting is to him- or herself but is 
uncertain about its value to other bidders. The seller is 
also uncertain about its value to the bidders. No bidder 
plans to resell the painting. This assumption of no resale 
means that each bidder cares about the value of the paint-
ing to others only insofar as it affects how others will bid. 
Put differently, even if bidders knew each other's values, 
no bidder would change the maximum amount he or she 
would be willing to pay. In this model, that is, bidders 
have independent private values. 
Assume the model has N bidders. Let vl denote the 
value of the painting to bidder i. That is, vt is the maxi-
mum amount bidder i is willing to pay for the painting. 
We model the uncertainty about other bidders' values by 
assuming that bidder Vs value is a random variable drawn 
from a distribution •) on [0,V]. We assume that bidders 
are risk-neutral, so that a bidder who pays m and receives 
the painting has a payoff of (v-m). The seller is also risk-
neutral. Bidders and the seller care about expected pay-
offs. 
Each auction procedure can be described as a set of 
rules for bidders, describing at each stage what bidders 
can do as a function of the history of the auction. Given 
these rules, a strategy for a bidder prescribes what the bid-
der should do at each stage of the auction as a function of 
the history up to that stage and as a function of that bid-
der's private valuation v, . A collection of such strategies 
for each of the bidders together with the rules of the auc-
tion procedure determines the outcome of the auction. This 
outcome should be thought of as who gets the object and 
how much each bidder pays. This outcome determines the 
payoffs of each bidder. Again, a Nash equilibrium is a col-
lection of such prescriptions or strategies, such that given 
the strategies of the other bidders, none strictly prefers to 
change his or her strategy. 
Now, this may sound numbingly complex, and it is. 
Fortunately, an insight due to Myerson (1979) and Harris 
and Townsend (1981) allows us to simplify the problem 
considerably. 
Consider replacing a complicated auction procedure by 
the following mechanism. All bidders, privately and confi-
dentially, report their valuation, \\, to an impartial comput-
er. The computer is programmed with the equilibrium 
strategies of the complicated auction and uses them by, in 
effect, running through the entire auction, doing what the 
bidders would have done, and producing an outcome. This 
outcome, of course, depends on the valuations of all the 
bidders. With this computerized mechanism, the decision 
problem of an individual is simply what value to enter in-
to the computer. This mechanism is called a revelation 
mechanism since each individual reveals his or her private 
information to the computer. 
The remarkable result, due to Myerson (1979) and Har-
ris and Townsend (1981), is that the equilibrium outcome 
of any auction procedure can be reproduced as a truth-tell-
ing equilibrium of the revelation mechanism. The reason 
is simple. Since the original strategies constituted an equi-
librium and the computer is going to play those strategies 
anyway, no bidder could do better by reporting a different 
value than the true one; all that a different report would 
do is make the computer choose a different—and, hence, 
less desirable—course of action. 
From the perspective of bidder i, the revelation mecha-
nism induces three outcome functions. Each of these is a 
function of the report, vif of bidder i. These functions are 
the probability of winning the object, pt{-)\ the expected 
payment conditional on winning the object, wz( •); and the 
expected payment conditional on losing the object, /,(•)• 
The payoff to a bidder who reports a value v- and 
whose true valuation is vt is, then, given by 
(1) itfv,,v,)=AW, - w.^)] - [i - Pimm-
At a truth-telling equilibrium, we have, for all /, 
(2) TCXV^V^TCXV^V,). 
Alternatively, if the expected payoff is differentiable in 
vl, we have 
(3) dnfo^/dv^ 0. 
Condition (2) or (3) can be used with some additional 
assumptions to establish a remarkable result known as the 
revenue equivalence theorem. This theorem requires that 
we specialize the model further. Assume that the bidders' 
valuations are symmetric; that is, the distribution functions 
are the same for all bidders. Denote this common distribu-
tion function by F. We will say that an auction procedure 
is efficient if it allocates the object to the bidder with the 
highest value. Assume also that the lowest valuation bid-
5 ders receive zero expected payoff. The theorem asserts 
that all auction procedures with these properties have the 
same expected payoff to the seller. Formally, we have 
this: 
PROPOSITION (Revenue Equivalence Theorem). Every efficient 
auction with symmetric, risk-neutral, independent private-
values bidders which assigns zero expected payoffs to 
bidders with the lowest values yields the same expected 
revenues to the seller. 
Proof. Note that, with symmetric bidders, the expected 
payoff functions of all bidders are the same. Denote these 
common expected payoffs at the truth-telling equilibrium 
by 7t*(v-). Using the envelope theorem in (3), we have 
(4) n'W=pfy}. 
Integrating (4) and using the hypothesis that 71*(0) = 0, we 
have 
(5) n(y) = Ppi(x) dx. 
Jo 
For an efficient auction, pt(x) is simply the probability 
that the highest bidder's valuation is x. Thus, the expected 
payoffs of bidders are entirely determined from the distri-
bution function F(-). Therefore, all auction procedures 
satisfying the hypotheses of the proposition yield the same 
expected payoffs to bidders. Since all auctions generate 
the same total surplus, the expected payoff of the seller is 
the same. Q.E.D. 
To understand the relevance of this result, consider 
some examples of specific types of auctions when only 
one object is being sold. In sealed-bid auctions, each bid-
der silently submits a bid. In a first-price, sealed-bid auc-
tion, each bidder submits a bid and the object is awarded 
to the highest bidder at that bidder's price. In a second-
price, sealed-bid auction, each bidder submits a bid and 
the object is awarded to the highest bidder at the price bid 
by the next-highest bidder. In open-outcry auctions, an 
auctioneer calls out prices to all bidders. In a descending-
price, open-outcry auction (also called a Dutch auction 
since it was used in Holland to sell tulips), the auctioneer 
starts the price high and lowers it until some bidder claims 
the object. In an ascending-price, open-outcry auction 
(also called an English auction), the auctioneer starts the 
price low and raises it, stopping when only one bidder 
remains. With symmetry, all of these auctions are efficient 
and give zero payoffs to the lowest bidder. Thus, they all 
yield the same expected revenue. 
Now, on the surface, these auctions seem quite differ-
ent. In a second-price auction, for example, the best a bid-
der can do is submit his or her true valuation. Obviously, 
bidding higher than the true valuation would mean run-
ning the risk of paying more than the object is worth. 
Might a bidder want to bid less than the value of the ob-
ject to that bidder? No, because all that such a strategy 
would do is reduce the chances of winning. It would have 
no effect on the price paid if the bidder wins. Thus, bid-
ding one's valuation regardless of the actions of others is 
a dominant strategy. The seller's revenues are given by 
the value of the object to the second-highest bidder. 
How could such an auction yield the same revenue as 
a first-price, sealed-bid auction? The result, due to Vickrey 
(1961), comes from the following reasoning. In a first-
price auction, bidders shade their bids below their valua-
tions. By doing so, they risk losing the object but pay less 
when they win. In equilibrium, each bidder's strategy is 
an increasing function of value. Thus, the object is as-
signed to the bidder with the highest valuation. The reve-
nue equivalence theorem tells us that the bid-shading in 
the first-price auction results in exactly the same revenue 
as the second-price auction yielded. One can apply similar 
reasoning to other auctions [as Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
have done]. 
The Correlated-Values Model 
The revenue equivalence theorem tells us that which type 
of auction the seller chooses doesn't matter much. But, of 
course, the theorem follows from assumptions which may 
or may not be relevant in actual applications. For the 
example of an auction for Treasury debt, one assumption 
is very questionable. Treasury securities are easy to resell 
in the active secondary market. Thus, the value of a par-
ticular Treasury security to a bidder depends on how much 
others are willing to pay for it. Thus, the assumption of 
independent private values seems very unlikely to hold 
here. We turn, therefore, to a model with correlated values. 
Consider, again, the example of the painting being sold, 
but now assume that the painting can be bought and then 
sold to others. In this situation, a bidder's willingness to 
pay is affected both by the bidder's own valuation and by 
what the painting would fetch if it were resold in the sec-
ondary market. The price in the resale market, in turn, de-
pends on the willingness to pay of others. That is, in de-
termining a bid, each bidder must take into account all the 
bidders' values: bidder values are correlated. In the exam-
ple of the painting, suppose that the winning bidder plans 
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to keep the painting for some time and then to sell it. A 
bidder's willingness to pay now depends both on how 
much the painting is worth to that bidder while the bidder 
owns it and on how much it will fetch when sold. We will 
use the term value estimate to describe a bidder's maxi-
mum willingness to pay given that bidder's information. 
In this situation, a phenomenon known as the winners 
curse can emerge. Consider, for example, a first-price, 
sealed-bid auction for our well-worn painting. Imagine 
that you have submitted a bid and have just been called 
and told "Congratulations, you have won." Along with the 
thrill of winning comes a frightening thought. By winning, 
you have found out that your bid was higher than any-
body else's; thus, others probably value the painting less 
than you do. Therefore, if you wanted to resell it, you 
would probably lose money. As a winner, you are cursed. 
On more careful inspection, though, this phenomenon 
does not imply that winners should vow never again to 
attend an auction. Instead, it implies that bidders will opti-
mally shade their bids, recognizing that, if they win, then-
bid was the highest. 
The revenue equivalence theorem now does not neces-
sarily hold. Milgrom and Weber (1982) have shown that 
the expected revenues of someone selling a single object 
in four different types of auctions can be ranked this way, 
from highest to lowest revenues: 
1. The ascending-price, open-outcry (English) auction. 
2. The second-price, sealed-bid auction. 
3. Tied: The first-price, sealed-bid auction and 
the descending-price, open-outcry 
(Dutch) auction. 
Rather than repeat Milgrom and Weber's (1982) formal 
results here, we provide some intuition. Recall that when 
values are correlated, the winner's curse causes bid-shad-
ing. A first-price auction awards the object to the highest 
bidder at the bid price. If other bidders value the object 
much less than the highest bidder does, then the object is 
worth much less than the bid price if the winner wants to 
resell it. Thus, all bidders fearing this kind of event end up 
shading their bids well below their own estimates. In con-
trast, in a second-price auction, the winner pays the price 
bid by the next-highest bidder. Thus, bidders are induced 
to raise their bids above their first-price auction bids by 
the knowledge that they will not lose if other bidders esti-
mate the value of the object to be very low. In fact, the 
equilibrium bidding strategies in a second-price auction 
turn out to be fairly simple. Each bidder tries to answer 
the following question: "If I knew that my estimate was 
the highest and that the second-highest estimate was just 
marginally below mine, what would I then revise my esti-
mate to be?" The equilibrium strategy is to bid the revised 
estimate. So, while the equilibrium strategy is not quite as 
simple as it was in the independent private-values environ-
ment, it is still relatively easy. 
In an ascending-price, open-outcry (English) auction, 
revenues are even higher than in the second-price auction. 
The reason is that, as this auction proceeds, it reveals in-
formation about the value estimates of other bidders. As 
the auctioneer raises prices, some bidders drop out. Other 
bidders gain information about the value estimates of the 
dropouts and thus are able to revise their own estimates. 
The availability of this information reduces the winner's 
curse and causes bidders to bid more aggressively. That 
raises the seller's revenues. 
One simple way of thinking about this English auction 
(as in Milgrom and Weber 1982) is to consider a situation 
with only two bidders. Each bidder's strategy is described 
by a single number which specifies at what price that bid-
der will drop out. The price paid by the winning bidder is 
marginally higher than the dropout price of the losing bid-
der. From a strategic point of view, of course, this is the 
same as a second-price auction. Thus, the seller's revenues 
are the same in both types of auctions. 
Now consider an auction which initially had N bidders 
but /V - 2 have dropped out. The remaining two bidders 
know the prices at which the others have dropped out and 
have revised their value estimates accordingly. These two 
bidders now engage in a second-price auction with appro-
priately revised estimates. Why does this revelation of 
information during the auction cause bidders to bid more 
aggressively during the auction? 
One way to think about the reasoning is as follows. 
Recall that in a second-price auction, the equilibrium strat-
egy is to assume that one's own value estimate is the high-
est and that the next-highest bid is just slightly lower. As-
sume that three bidders are engaged in a second-price auc-
tion. Label these bidders 1,2, and 3. Consider informing 
bidder 1, just before that bidder is to submit a bid, that his 
or her value estimate is the highest. Would this change 
bidder 1 's strategy? The answer is that it would not since 
the bidder has effectively already assumed that his or her 
estimate is the highest. Suppose now that you informed 
bidder 1 of the opposite: that his or her estimate is the 
lowest. Clearly, this information would cause the bidder 
to bid more aggressively. In effect, the English auction re-
7 veals this information to bidder 1 as it proceeds. Thus, it 
leads to higher revenues for the seller. 
One implication of the theory is that auctions should be 
conducted as ascending-price, open-outcry auctions. In-
deed, most auctions are of this type. To maximize the sel-
ler's revenue, most others should use the second-price, 
sealed-bid procedure. Yet auctions often use the first-price, 
sealed-bid procedure. Why are some auctions of this ap-
parently inferior type? 
In some situations, sealed-bid auctions are simply more 
practical than open-outcry auctions. Obviously, open-out-
cry auctions require bidders or their trusted agents to be 
present during the auction, and that is not always possible. 
Now, in theory, bidders could effectively duplicate the as-
cending-price, open-outcry auctions by submitting written 
or electronic bid schedules, telling the auctioneer how 
they would bid as a function of the prices at which other 
bidders drop out. But such bid schedules would have to 
be so incredibly long and complicated that they are just 
not feasible. 
The next-best procedure should be the second-price, 
sealed-bid auction. But this has a serious problem too— 
one it shares, in fact, with the open-outcry auction. Both 
of these procedures require that the auctioneer be com-
pletely trustworthy, a somewhat unrealistic condition in 
the private sector. Consider what happens, for example, in 
a second-price, sealed-bid auction if the auctioneer is not 
trustworthy. Once the bids are opened, the auctioneer has 
a great incentive to cheat: to insert bids just below the 
winning bid in order to extract higher revenue. Bidders, of 
course, recognize that fact before they bid and respond by 
treating second-price auctions as first-price auctions. In the 
private sector, therefore, the lower-revenue first-price auc-
tions are common. 
When a government agency is the auctioneer, however, 
cheating seems much less likely. Thus, unlike private sell-
ers, the U.S. Treasury could use the higher-revenue sec-
ond-price auction procedure. 
Complications 
While the theory developed thus far has dealt with single-
object auctions, the results generalize relatively straightfor-
wardly to more complicated situations, like auctions with 
more than one object for sale. The results do not general-
ize quite so straightforwardly if bidders are risk-averse or 
if they collude. However, we will argue that risk-neutrality 
and competitive behavior are reasonable assumptions for 
Treasury auctions. 
Consider first a situation with N bidders, each of whom 
wishes to buy one unit, and where M < N units are 
offered for sale. The multiple-price analog of a first-price 
auction is a discriminatory auction, where the M highest 
bidders are awarded the items at their bid prices. The 
analog of a second-price auction is a uniform-price auc-
tion, where each bidder pays the price bid by the highest 
rejected bidder. The theory can be extended to cover these 
situations, and the results are the same: the uniform-price 
(second-price) auction dominates the discriminatory (first-
price) auction. 
Matters are more complicated when bidders have 
demand schedules expressing the number of units they are 
willing to buy at various prices. While the theory has not 
been completely developed for that situation, the economic 
logic of the arguments for the single-object environment 
seem likely to carry over. 
Thus far, we have assumed that bidders are risk-neu-
tral. Now let's see what happens if they're risk-averse. 
If bidders are risk-averse in the independent private-
values context, then the seller's expected revenues are 
higher in a first-price (discriminatory) auction than in a 
second-price (uniform-price) auction. The reason is that 
submitting one's true valuation remains a dominant strat-
egy in the second- (or uniform-) price auction. Risk-aver-
sion implies a willingness to pay an actuarially unfair pre-
mium to avoid large losses. Thus, in a first-price (discrim-
inatory) auction, risk-averse bidders are willing to pay 
more than risk-neutral bidders to avoid the large loss from 
failing to win the object. (See Matthews 1983 for an anal-
ysis of auctions with risk-averse bidders.) 
If value estimates are correlated, however, the compari-
son for seller revenues across auction types becomes am-
biguous. The theory, therefore, does not have much to say 
about the consequences for the Treasury if bidders are 
risk-averse. If risk-aversion is a major concern, the Trea-
suiy should not switch to a uniform-price auction. But we 
think risk-aversion should not be a major concern: no sin-
gle Treasury auction is large relative to the wealth of actu-
al and potential market participants, and it is not clear 
whether the Treasury does, or should have, attitudes to-
ward risk that are substantially different from those of the 
participants. We thus think risk-aversion issues may be 
reasonably ignored for Treasury auctions. 
The theory is also ambiguous if bidder valuations are 
drawn from different distributions. (See Milgrom 1989 for 
a nice example.) As a practical matter, market participants 
acquire information about eventual market prices in rough-
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ly the same way. Therefore, this issue too may be safely 
ignored. 
What about collusive behavior among bidders? Let's 
answer that first for single-object auctions. In the indepen-
dent private-values context, second-price auctions are 
more susceptible to collusive behavior than first-price auc-
tions are. To see this, suppose a second-price auction has 
only two bidders, and they agree to tell each other their 
valuations and to adopt a strategy where the one with the 
lower value bids zero and the one with the higher value 
bids that value. For a promised side-payment, the lower-
value bidder agrees to this arrangement and has an incen-
tive to abide by it. Consider now what happens with a 
first-price auction. The only way the higher-value bidder 
can gain over the outcome without collusion is to bid less 
than the lower-value bidder's valuation. (Recall the rev-
enue equivalence theorem.) But now the lower-value bid-
der has an incentive to defect. 
In situations with multiple objects, recall, the analog of 
a second-price auction is a uniform-price auction and the 
analog of a first-price auction is a discriminatory auction. 
Thus, considerations of collusive behavior seem to suggest 
that discriminatory auctions should be favored for Trea-
sury debt. However, two considerations militate against 
accepting this conclusion too quickly. First, the Treasury's 
current system has 39 primary dealers. Setting up, and en-
forcing, collusive arrangements among this large a group 
would be a formidable task. Second, as we shall see in the 
next section, uniform-price auctions stimulate entry into 
bidding, which is anticollusive. 
Benefits of Uniform-Price Auctions 
If the Treasury switched its auctions to the more-feasible 
of the two auction types that yield the highest revenue— 
the uniform-price auction—then the general public welfare 
would be improved in at least two ways. 
Less Information Acquisition 
The current system for auctioning Treasury debt creates 
large incentives to acquire information about other bid-
ders' actions as well as the eventual state of market de-
mand. These incentives would be much smaller under the 
uniform-price auction system. 
To see this, consider a situation where one of the bid-
ders—say, bidder 1—incurs a cost and acquires the esti-
mated values of all other bidders. Acquiring these esti-
mates will cause bidder 1 's estimate to be revised; but if 
the original estimate was unbiased, then the expected val-
ue of the revised estimate will be the same as the original 
estimate. For now, therefore, assume that acquiring this 
information causes no change in the estimated value for 
bidder 1. Assume for now also that other bidders do not 
change their strategies. 
We want to focus on how bidder 1 's bidding strategy 
changes after acquiring the information. Recall that bids 
are increasing in the estimated values. When bidder 1 does 
not have the information of other bidders' estimates, the 
bidder wins whenever his or her estimate is the highest. 
Consider, first, the situation when the bidder's estimate, 
before the information was acquired, was the highest. In 
a second- or uniform-price auction, such a situation would 
not change the amount paid by the bidder (since we have 
assumed no change in the behavior of other bidders). In 
contrast, in a first-price or discriminatory auction, bidder 
1 now shades his or her bid further down to just above the 
bid of the next-highest bidder. Thus, whenever the bidder 
would have won, a first-price or discriminatory auction 
yields a gain to information and a second- or uniform-
price auction does not. 
In situations where the bidder would have lost, matters 
are more complicated. Once bidder 1 acquires the infor-
mation, that bidder is willing to pay any amount up to the 
estimate. Two possibilities must be considered. Either 
some bidders' bids are more than bidder l's estimate, or 
some bidders' bids are less than bidder l's estimate but 
more than bidder 1 's bid without the information. 
If some bidders are willing to pay more than bidder 1 's 
estimate, the bidder drops out of the auction. Now, recall 
that bid-shading is more extreme with first-price (or dis-
criminatory) auctions than with second- (or uniform-) 
price auctions. In both types of auctions, bidder 1 would 
have lost without the information and is happy to do so 
with the information. Since bid-shading is more extreme 
with first-price (discriminatory) auctions, the probability 
that some bidders will bid higher than bidder 1 's estimate 
is smaller in those auctions than in second- (or uniform-) 
price auctions. The potential gains to changing the strat-
egy are therefore higher. 
Next, consider the case when some bidders' bids are 
between bidder l's estimate and bidder l's bid without 
the information. In this situation, the theory is ambiguous 
about which auction provides greater incentives to acquire 
information. However, given the gains in the other two 
situations, the overall effect is likely to enhance the incen-
tives to acquire information. 
Of course, if other bidders recognize that bidder 1 has 
acquired information, they will modify their strategies as 
9 well. One way of modeling the change in other bidders' 
behavior is to assume that, by incurring a cost, bidder 1 is 
informed, with some small probability, of the valuations 
of other bidders. The other bidders do not know whether 
or not bidder 1 has acquired this information. If the prob-
ability of acquiring the information is sufficiently small, 
then the change in the bidding strategies of the other bid-
ders will be small, and the analysis above applies. If this 
probability is 1, it can be shown that the expected payoff 
to the less-informed bidders is zero under both types of 
auctions. Thus, in this case, the incentives to acquire infor-
mation are the same under both types. Therefore, we ar-
gue that the incentives to acquire information are general-
ly higher with first-price (or discriminatory) auctions. 
From this result comes the conclusion that first-price 
(discriminatory) auctions yield lower revenues to the Trea-
sury and lead to larger amounts of resources devoted to 
gathering information than do second-price (uniform-price) 
auctions. Is this information-gathering a socially valuable 
activity? To the extent that it involves gathering informa-
tion about how much other bidders are willing to pay, it 
merely redistributes payments from uninformed to in-
formed bidders. This information has no value to society 
as a whole. Even worse, the existence of informed bidders 
drives relatively uninformed bidders away from the auc-
tion. Thus, auction procedures which provide large incen-
tives to acquire information lead to fewer active unin-
formed bidders. This reduction in the number of bidders 
tends to reduce revenues to the Treasury. 
We want to emphasize here that the true social cost of 
the current auction procedures is the excessive resources 
devoted to gathering information about potential bidders. 
Channeling these resources to other activities is likely to 
enhance welfare. 
Less Market Manipulation 
A switch to a uniform-price auction procedure would 
improve welfare in at least one other way. The Treasury's 
recent review of its auction procedures was spurred, in 
part, from violations of Treasury rules by Salomon Broth-
ers in 1990 and from two instances of so-called short 
squeezes in 1991. These sorts of attempts to manipulate 
the market for Treasury securities should be less likely un-
der a uniform-price auction procedure. 
Let's briefly review the current structure of the market 
for Treasury securities. Approximately a week to 10 days 
before a Treasury auction, dealers and investors actively 
participate in a when-issued market. This is a market in 
forward contracts. Participants agree to deliver and accept 
delivery of specified quantities of a Treasury security 
when it is issued at a currently agreed-on price. Those 
who agree to deliver soon after the security is issued are 
known as the shorts; those who agree to wait for delivery, 
the longs. The market performs a price-discovery role; 
that is, it provides information to bidders about the likely 
state of market demand for the Treasury security when it 
is issued. This information benefits auction bidders who 
face uncertainty about the prices at which they will be 
able to resell Treasury securities. 
To see the possibilities for market manipulation, con-
sider the following scenario. A trader or group of traders 
commits to a forward contract for a large amount of a 
Treasury security, on the long side of the contract; they 
agree to accept delivery of the security when it is issued. 
The same person or group then purchases a large amount 
of the Treasury security at the auction. Now, those who 
have committed to deliver the security (the shorts) must 
acquire the security in the marketplace. But they find that 
most of the securities are held by those on the long side 
of the forward contract. Since the forward contract speci-
fies delivery of that particular security, the shorts are 
squeezed. (See Sundaresan 1992 for a proposal to replace 
the when-issued market by a cash-settled futures market.) 
This possibility tends to reduce the volume of trade in the 
when-issued market and thus raise the costs of price dis-
covery. The risks imposed on bidders are then passed on 
to the Treasury as lower revenues. 
The Treasury recognizes this problem and is also sensi-
tive to general concerns that particular traders may seek to 
corner a market. It therefore imposes limits on the amount 
that bidders can bid at the auction. These are the rules that 
traders at Salomon Brothers tried to circumvent in 1990 
by submitting fraudulent bids in customers' names. 
What are the likely consequences of our proposed re-
form on the when-issued market and on the prospect for 
short squeezes? First, a switch to a uniform-price auction 
procedure would reduce the role of the when-issued mar-
ket. With uniform pricing, bidders would have less of an 
incentive to acquire information about other bidders' will-
ingness to pay. We have already argued that this reduction 
is socially desirable. Second, to the extent that short trad-
ers fear the prospect of a squeeze, a uniform-price auction 
procedure would let these traders purchase the security at 
the auction more cheaply than they can under the current 
system. The reason is that, under the current system, a 
short trader must submit a bid at a high price and be will-
ing to pay that price to guarantee not being squeezed. 
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Under a uniform-price auction, short traders are unlikely 
to substantially affect the price they pay for the security 
by submitting a high price. Therefore, they can protect 
themselves better, and the prospects of market manipula-
tion are reduced. 
Concluding Remarks 
A switch to either an ascending-price, open-outcry auction 
or a uniform-price auction for U.S. Treasury debt is likely 
to raise Treasury revenues and reduce excessive resources 
devoted to information-gathering. The ascending-price 
auction has the disadvantage of requiring physical pres-
ence at the auction. (Of course, this type of auction could 
be conducted with remote electronic terminals.) To the 
extent that such presence is costly, it raises entry barriers 
to the auction and is wasteful. Furthermore, it is more bur-
densome to bidders since the strategic calculations in-
volved are more complicated. The uniform-price auction 
is strategically much less complicated. This feature also 
tends to reduce entry barriers. 
Ultimately, the issue is relatively simple. The current 
organization of the Treasury market has primary dealers 
who purchase at the auction and resell to the public at 
large. With so many close substitutes and an efficient 
Treasury market, no reforms of the auction procedure will 
change prices to the ultimate holders very much, if at all. 
Entry is possible into the dealer/broker arena, and the mar-
ket is competitive enough that, as a first approximation, 
such dealers make no more than the normal return on 
their investments. The only questions that remain are 
whether those investments are affected by the Treasury's 
auction procedure and whether they are at the socially op-
timal level. 
The investments of Treasury dealer/brokers are in the 
form of a network of people who have learned to work 
with each other, ultimate buyers, and the Treasury. An im-
portant part of their activity is to acquire information 
about the behavior of actual and potential bidders. The 
when-issued market serves this role. We have argued that, 
given the auction procedure, this information is privately 
valuable and that market participants will rationally invest 
to acquire it. We have also argued that this information 
has dubious social value. With our proposed change in the 
auction procedure, the incentives to acquire this informa-
tion would be lower, and over time, these investments 
would not be replaced. Thus, over time, the returns going 
to these investments would accrue to the Treasury. 
These arguments suggest that changes in the auction 
procedure will take time to yield gains in Treasury rev-
enue. No experiment conducted over any period as short 
as even a year is likely to generate significant changes in 
Treasury revenue. Patience appears to be a must. 
Another implication of our arguments is that if the re-
forms are implemented, the when-issued market will like-
ly shrink. This market currently serves a variety of pur-
poses, one of which is price-discovery: the market lets 
participants learn about each other's willingness to pay for 
Treasury securities. This role is extremely important for 
participants who want to reduce the risks of the Treasury 
auction. But the risks are largely due to the current form 
of the auction. The talents and resources now involved in 
the when-issued market are a rational response to the cur-
rent auction procedure. With a uniform-price auction, some 
of these talents and resources could go to more socially 
productive activities. 
We are certainly not the first to advocate a change in 
the Treasury auction procedure, or even this specific 
change. Milton Friedman advocated a uniform-price auc-
tion in testimony to the Joint Economic Committee in 
1959 (excerpted in Friedman 1991). More recently, other 
economists have advocated this proposal—for example, 
Merton Miller in Henriques 1991. We think a large major-
ity of economists support the proposal (which, admittedly, 
may be a popular argument against it). In this paper, we 
have tried to argue that everything we know from eco-
nomic theory tends to support it. 
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